Choosing the Best House in a Bad Neighborhood: Location Strategies of Human Rights INGOs in the Non-Western World*

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What determines the location of those human rights international non-governmental organization (INGO) resources found outside of the highly developed Western democracies? We draw a distinction between the bottom-up mobilization processes driving the location of human rights organization (HRO) members from the top-down strategic concerns driving where HRO leaders place permanent offices. In particular, we find that, while political opportunity structures generally increase the likelihood that a state has HRO members, it has a curvilinear influence on the number of HRO secretariats, which typically locate in areas seen as having a higher need for organizational resources. Further, while there is no clear connection between human rights abuses and HRO memberships in a state, HROs’ strategic concerns lead them to place offices with reference to both local and neighborhood “need”—in other words, levels of repression.

Where do international human rights organizations (HROs) set up shop? Civil society and international non-governmental organization (INGO) theorists argue that organizations flourish in the most developed, democratized, and globalized areas of the world—in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, which all have vast numbers of INGOs active within their borders (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Boli and Thomas 1999; Beckfield 2003; Smith and Wiest 2005). Scholars generally view the presence of such organizations as resulting from an organic, bottom-up process, whereby political opportunity structures and globalization connect individuals to the larger world around them. Accordingly, the extent of HRO presence should reflect conditions within the state that favor their development—including open institutions that encourage citizen participation and an established respect for human rights within the polity.

Human rights organizations also operate outside of the global West, but we know less about what factors shape the size and scope of their activities in these generally less developed places. The same logic that accounts for HRO presence in advanced industrialized democracies might also apply to the rest of the world (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). However, the canonical literature on human rights improvement indicates that it is the need for improved human rights conditions that drives HRO involvement in a state. Organizations set up shop to be close to repressed populations and to assist in pressuring governments to end their repressive practices (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Unlike much of the general INGO and civil society literatures, the human rights and HRO-specific literatures see organizational presence...
as largely inorganic—the result of a top-down decision-making process, in which organizations’ leadership decides how and where to commit resources (Brysk 1993; Carpenter 2007).

So, which argument better explains patterns of HRO location? Outside of the most developed Western democracies, does HRO presence reflect a bottom-up or top-down logic? In this paper, we argue that both causal processes operate, but that they correspond with different manifestations of HRO presence. In broad terms, HRO presence within a state can take two forms: (i) an organization can have members within a country (hereafter referred to as HRO membership); and (ii) an organization can establish a permanent office (hereafter referred to as secretariats) within a country (Murdie and Bhasin 2011:164). Of course, these forms are not mutually exclusive. They share important similarities. They likely reinforce one another. However, membership and secretariats constitute distinct outcomes. We argue that they follow fundamentally different causal processes and that we can observe these differences in their respective responses to political opportunity structures and state repression.

Consistent with the classic civil society literature and previous empirical work, we posit that an organic, bottom-up process determines HRO membership within a state. This logic implies membership rates are especially responsive to domestic structures and stimuli that are more (or less) conducive to the local development of human rights activism (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). As such, we should observe greater membership presence in states with more open political opportunity structures. However, membership levels should be largely unrelated to human rights practices. Although more citizens may be motivated to join movements when they observe local need for advocacy, the repressive practices themselves may also make people wary of joining human rights movements and putting their own physical integrity at risk (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and Wiest 2005).

In contrast, we contend that HRO secretariat placement follows a more top-down logic—one in which organizational leadership decides to directly intervene in a particular state. Organizational leaders display greater sensitivity to the larger vision of achieving better human rights practices on a global scale than their membership. At the same time, they face the primary responsibility for managing their organization’s limited resources. They seek to maximize the returns on their investments in terms of global human rights outcomes. This means that, when choosing where to establish offices, they must balance the imperative of servicing local need with the pragmatic necessity of operational efficiency. For example, the worst human rights violators are often states where HROs have great difficulty functioning, such as Russia, Egypt, Sudan, or Cambodia. Even though HROs want to stop repression in these states, illiberal political structures make it difficult for an HRO to effectively operate within their borders. As such, organizational leadership will be leery of establishing HRO secretariats in states with closed-off political opportunity structures. However, HRO leaders will also hesitate to spend resources establishing secretariats in states with open political opportunity structures that foster bottom-up membership bases.

Further, this struggle to balance need against functionality requires HROs to make strategic decisions based on broader regional, or “neighborhood,” considerations. We argue that in areas of the world with the most chronic human rights abuses, HROs bypass the neediest, most repressive countries. They look instead to those that are relatively less repressive than their neighbors, as these locations provide them with a more stable working environment. Once established, the organization can then work in ways that allow resources to cross into the more repressive surrounding states; they aid in the effort to improve human rights conditions from across the border (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may explain the growing HRO presence in such countries as South Africa, Kenya, and Turkey (SERD 1998; Davis 2011; Goksel 2011). In short, the top-down logic of HRO’s leadership leads them to “choose the best house in a bad neighborhood.”

Alternatively, in neighborhoods with better general respect for human rights, HROs need not establish these types of cross-border platforms. Because even the most repressive states in these neighborhoods typically create few serious obstacles to the effective operation of HROs, we argue that HROs are more likely to go directly to the states in which they see the greatest need for their advocacy. They therefore will establish secretariats in those states that are relatively more repressive than their neighbors.

Although it is intrinsically important to refine our understanding of the strategic incentives driving INGOs’ behaviors, our argument carries with it broader implications. A small but growing body of empirical work suggests that INGO presence, both in the form of members and secretariats, substantially affects a number of important outcomes—including human rights violations and political protest. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) show that the presence of INGO members on the ground in a country leads to greater respect for physical integrity rights. Neumayer (2005) demonstrates that signing human rights treaties positively affects a state’s behavior only in conjunction with a local INGO presence. Likewise, Smith-Cannoy (2012) argues that the utilization of individual petition mechanisms in international human rights treaties depends on NGO and INGO efforts within the signatory state. Thus, if we hope to understand why international human rights law is more effective in some locations than others, we also need to understand variation in the number of INGOs that operate in different states.

Additional work shows that the presence of HRO offices or headquarters in a state leads to an increased probability that Amnesty International issues urgent action reports (Meermik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols 2012). Murdie and Davis (2012) show that shaming by HROs, coupled with local HRO membership, increases the probability of an improvement in respect for physical integrity rights. This all demonstrates the impact these organizations can have when operating inside a country. Not only does their presence increase the likelihood of shaming, but also, when coupled with a membership presence on the ground, leads to actual improvements in human rights conditions. Borders do not constrain the positive effects of HROs’ operations. Bell et al. (2012) show that the presence of HRO members in neighboring states can similarly lead to better respect for physical integrity rights.

Human rights organizations influence other political outcomes in addition to respect for human rights. Murdie and Bhasin (2011) find that HRO membership presence increases the level of nonviolent protest in a state, while HRO secretariat presence increases the level of both nonviolent and violent protest. Building on this
work, Bell, Bhasin, Clay, and Murdie. (2014) find that where domestic presence is lacking, HRO membership in neighboring states leads to an increase in nonviolent protest activity. Thus, given the role these organizations play both within states and across borders, we need to understand why they locate where they do. Furthermore, much of the above research suggests different effects from membership and secretariat presence. As such, we should try to understand not only why HROs are present within a country, but also the different motivations driving their particular mode of entry.

Below, we further develop our theoretical logic and then test the empirical implications using a time-series cross-national data set of non-Western countries from 1990 to 2003. The results largely support our theory. They demonstrate that divergent processes lead to a more or less expansive HRO membership and HRO secretariat presence within a state. Not all INGO presence is equal, and by outlining these distinctions, our project addresses long-standing discrepancies between the human rights and civil society literatures’ respective conceptualizations of organizational presence. These findings matter a great deal for practitioners and policymakers interested in supporting the bottom-up growth of civil society, as well as for those interested in how human rights activism can exist in areas less amenable to bottom-up growth. It seems that organizations make top-down decisions in ways that respond to need, all the while balancing their ability to operate effectively within the polity.

Background

Most of the literature on INGOs sees their growth as an outcropping of globalization (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999) and the expansion of political opportunity structures (McCarty and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1988). For globalization scholars, INGO presence in a country increases as people become more socialized to the world cultural values that come with being part of the global polity (Boli and Thomas 1999; Smith and Wiest 2005). Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004), the only large-n study we are aware of that focuses specifically on HRO presence, highlight that individuals are more likely to be part of the human rights movement when overall development and globalization make a “cognitive understanding of human rights issues” easier (596).

The social movement perspective has emphasized how political opportunity structures motivate INGO growth. When political institutions exist that make elites more sensitive to the demands of INGOs in the local context, individuals are more likely to see INGO activism as a realistic avenue for change (McCarty and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Likewise, when people have the freedom and capacity to organize around shared interests, INGO growth will likely follow (McCarty and Zald 1977). Using the Polity scale as a measure of political opportunity structures, Smith and Wiest (2005) find that such opportunity structures are positively associated with a larger INGO presence. Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) similarly find supporting evidence when using Freedom House’s measure of political and civil rights.

The sociological literature’s view of INGOs is at odds with that found in the transnational advocacy network (TAN) and human rights literature, typically from political science (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). While the former emphasizes factors that empower people to engage issue activism from the bottom-up, the latter implies that HRO involvement in a country reflects an organizational response to need and opportunity. More specifically, this literature argues that when political opportunity structures are lacking, people and/or groups within a country send out a call for aid against a repressive government. HROs respond to this call and, in turn, increase both domestic and international activism against the repressive regime to complete what looks like a “boomerang” for human rights improvement (Keck and Sikkink 1998:13). From this perspective, HRO’s leadership decides in a more top-down fashion when and where to intervene, with preference given to highly repressive countries where people have the greatest need for HRO assistance.

If we consider the factors that make repression more likely, we see that lack of development and lack of political opportunity structures are the exact opposite conditions that the INGO literature from sociology claims encourage organizational growth. In other words, these two literatures make very different predictions about where we should find a large HRO presence. Smith and Wiest (2005) and Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) both mention this puzzle in passing, with Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) going as far as to say the existence of a possible “boomerang” can create a “spill-over effect” where states without political opportunity structures but with greater “need” actually end up with more HROs (595). This puzzle serves as the springboard for our theory on HRO presence.

Theory

We contend that the perceived disconnect between the sociological INGO literature and the human rights/TAN literature is actually an artifact of (i) differences in theoretical scope; (ii) different conceptualizations of INGO presence; and (iii) inadequate consideration of how extraterritorial factors can condition the influence of repression on certain types of HRO presence. We tackle each in turn over the following pages.

Differences in Theoretical Scope

The sociological literature on INGO activity typically concerns itself with INGO growth across all countries of the world. As such, highly developed core states from the Western world, such as the Netherlands or France, are included in a sample with countries facing starker need for fundamental social change, such as Bhutan, Cambodia, and other human rights abusers (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). We are not implying that these highly developed core states do not have room to make human rights improvements. However, the high-density INGO presence in these countries is likely a result of factors specific to their advanced position in the global system. Nation-of-origin and major-donor effects make INGO numbers in highly developed core states statistical outliers relative to the rest of the sample. Consequently, characteristics particular to these states may inadvertently be overemphasized in the classic INGO literature. Different causal processes may be driving INGO presence in less developed countries around the globe.

This is not problematic if we are only interested in understanding the bottom-up process of organic INGO growth that is most prevalent in this body of work. However, it does create problems for comparing the implications of this literature with those from the human
incentives. In general, we contend that there is a need for HRO secretariats in countries that lack these functions, or even from entering the country altogether. In Murdie and Bhasin (2011), this type of INGO involvement is referred to as secretariat, or permanent office locations. When INGOs go into a country as part of a committed long-term strategy to induce change, they often start an office that will serve as their base of operations for their advocacy efforts.

Existing large-N empirical studies have, until now, relied on INGO membership data. As such, it is no surprise that the findings have attributed a strong positive role to political opportunity structures and other bottom-up factors emphasized by classic INGO theory, and only a limited role to factors like repression and “need.” The empirical literature has simply used data on the form of INGO presence that most closely follows the sociological approach.

In reviewing these literatures, we see some clear differences in how certain factors should affect each type of INGO involvement, particularly for HROs. First, political opportunity structures should have different effects on each form of HRO presence. Liberal and inclusive political systems are more conducive to the bottom-up growth of civil society, and citizens’ expression of that through participation in activist organizations (Smith and Wiest 2005). They impose fewer barriers to the kinds of activism that HRO members on the ground engage in, and should make citizens feel more confident that their involvement with such organizations will influence political elites (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam et al. 1996). In short, as it becomes easier and less costly for individuals to organize, we should see more bottom-up growth in HRO membership:

**Hypothesis 1:** More open political opportunity structures are positively correlated with HRO memberships.

Although the literature on HRO and INGO membership is clear about the positive influence of political opportunity structures on membership levels, it is less clear how HRO’s leadership will respond to variations in political opportunity structures when deciding where to locate a secretariat. HROs’ leadership may face divergent incentives. In general, we contend that there is a “Goldilocks” relationship between political opportunity structures and HRO secretariats: Political opportunity structures can neither be “too hot” nor “too cold” for HRO leaders to be willing to invest their scarce resources in a state.

Establishing a permanent office requires a large up-front investment, and organizations have limited resources. As such, they must be mindful of where they invest these resources. In countries with very open, inclusive political systems, individuals and groups have domestic avenues through which they can redress their grievances and effect political change from within. HRO efforts to promote local activism, strengthen group organization, and facilitate domestic connections to international movements will be most beneficial where the domestic political capacity for achieving these conditions is weak (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). Thus, on one hand, HRO’s leadership is likely to see its own direct involvement in a country as being most necessary when political opportunity structures are at least partially limited, and where the organization can act as a “strategic substitute” for lacking domestic structures (Murdie and Urpelainen 2014). On the other hand, however, opening and operating a secretariat realistically requires at least some semblance of political cooperation. States that completely restrict political opportunity structures likely bar organizations from carrying out their normal functions, or even from entering the country entirely.

The effect of these structures on HRO secretariats, therefore, may be curvilinear, reflecting both the greater need for HRO secretariats in countries that lack these political opportunity structures, but also the infeasibility of operating where they are nonexistent. This logic implies the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** HRO secretariats exist primarily where political opportunity structures are neither overly closed nor overly open.

“Need” and Neighborhood Effects

Human rights organization memberships and secretariats should also respond differently to repression. Addressing this difference for the top-down decision-making process that drives HRO secretariat placement, however, requires us to expand our focus beyond the state in question and consider how its human rights practices stand in relation to the practices of the states around it, or its “neighborhood.”

To begin, we should note that the existing literature claims that states’ human rights practices do not significantly influence HRO membership levels. Although citizens in less repressive states have less fear of government reprisal for joining an HRO, Smith and Wiest (2005) point out that they also have less incentive to join social movements, limiting any positive influence good human rights practices could have on membership levels. Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) further argue that the overall influence of repression on HRO memberships can resemble a “catching-up” process whereby countries that already have good human rights practices historically may have fewer memberships as human rights become “taken-for-granted” (610). Countries that are improving their human rights thus catch up to these early achievers, diminishing again any influence a lack of repression has
on HRO membership. In fact, this is exactly what Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) find in their work. We accordingly have no directional expectations about the effect of repression on HRO memberships.

In contrast, the top-down process implied in the human rights/TAN literature suggests that HROs’ secretariat placements should more clearly reflect a strategic response to need. However, this does not mean that HROs establish offices in direct proportion to a state’s level of human rights abuses. As previously noted, these organizations simply do not have the resources to maintain direct operations in all places at all times. Rather, a strategic response implies that HROs, who we assume seek to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of their investments, face an important trade-off: They must balance local need with their own ability to function. In the most repressive, neediest states, like Sudan in 2009 or Syria in 2012, repression may be so disruptive that it severely limits the functionality of the organization. Consistent with Bell et al. (2012) and many practitioner accounts, organizations may try to find safer areas around these most repressive states to make their “hub.” Davis (2011) has observed this dynamic in South Africa and Kenya, where organizations have established permanent offices from which to launch their work in the neighboring region. Likewise, accounts coming out of Syria during the 2011–2012 government crackdown also indicate that organizations are working from within Turkey to aid in the Syrian human rights crisis (Goksel 2011).

This implies that, in the worst neighborhoods around the world, HROs seek out comparatively less repressive states to serve as their regional base of operations. HROs can then work with volunteers and members in ways that allow resources to permeate into the more repressive neighboring states while also ensuring greater relative safety and operational efficiency for their staff.

However, there is another side to this logic: In neighborhoods where human rights are generally better respected, HROs would be best served by doing the opposite and establishing offices in those countries that are relatively more repressive than their neighbors. In such neighborhoods, the worst offenders are still relatively less repressive than the worst states in the worst neighborhoods. By going directly to where their efforts are needed most, HROs can eliminate any unnecessary additional costs associated with maneuvering across borders. This logic implies a dynamic that is akin to buying the best house in a bad neighborhood, but taking the fixer-upper in a good one. We offer the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: In neighborhoods where human rights are generally well respected, state repression has a positive influence on HRO secretariats. In more repressive neighborhoods, however, secretariats are more likely to be located in states with better human rights practices.

Our argument is that HRO secretariats respond differently to closed political opportunity structures and repression than HRO memberships. HRO membership bases grow as political opportunity structures grow; they do not reflect conditions where there is more domestic need. HRO secretariat placements are responsive to local need, but do require a baseline level of political openness that permits functionality, and are subject to the broader neighborhood context. This, at the most basic level, is reflective of the central logic underlying Keck and Sikkink (1998)’s boomerang model.

It is also consistent with practitioners’ accounts showing NGO staff members’ deep commitment to their organization’s mission, even in the face of danger. As Rogers (1998) points out, “NGOs today often have to assign staff to some of the most dangerous and insecure areas in the world, with little or no protection. These are places where many countries would not consider sending their armies” (np). Further, in an op-ed to the Washington Post, Worthington (2010) remarks, “none of the NGO workers in Pakistan—living under a daily threat of kidnappings or targeted killings—are cowards. The dangers they face are immense, and their bravery must be commended” (B04). This commitment may make HRO permanent staff members more likely than the typical citizen-member to fight on, even when political access and opportunity are stifled. Similarly, they may be more willing to remain in dangerous and violent situations, especially if they can serve the dire needs of not just the local community, but of the broader neighborhood, too.

Recent practitioner literature also points to how foreign NGOs’ permanent staff may be less at risk from government or non-governmental violence than national or local volunteers (Sheik, Isabel Gutierrez, Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren, and Burnham 2000; Sprang 2009; Stoddard, Harner, and DiDomienico 2009). This is an additional reason why HRO secretariats, often staffed by foreign employees, are more willing to endure the risks of operating across borders in dangerous neighborhoods. Unlike their local citizen-member counterparts, they may enjoy some immunity from violence. These accounts buttress the hypotheses outlined above.1

Research Design

To test these hypotheses, we utilize data on (i) the different types of HRO presence within states; (ii) political opportunity structures; and (iii) local and neighborhood levels of state repression. Combining these data with controls derived from theory and previous studies of INGO presence, including data on the degree to which states are integrated into the global polity, we estimate a series of negative binomial regressions on a sample of 114 non-Western countries from 1990 to 2003.2 Below, we discuss our operationalization of the key concepts presented above and the included control variables, before turning to a discussion of our findings.

Dependent Variables: HRO Membership and Secretariat Locations

We identify two distinct ways by which HROs may form a physical presence within a country and thus rely on two different dependent variables. First, we use Smith and Wiest’s (2005) measure of HRO Memberships, which counts the number of HROs that have local members or volun-

1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out these potential differences between citizen-members and permanent staff.

2 Herein, “Western” states are those identified by Teorell and Hadenius (2005) as belonging to the region group “Western Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand)” and include Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This information was obtained using Teorell, and Hadenius’ (2005) region identifier provided in The Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell, Samanni, Charron, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2010).
teers within a state’s borders in a given year. Second, to capture HRO Secretariat presence, we utilize an updated version of Murdie and Bhasin’s (2011) measure of the number of HROs with a permanent office/secretariat located within a country during a given year. Like Smith and Wiest’s (2005) data, these data were collected using information from the Yearbook of International Organizations.

As both dependent variables are measured as counts, neither is normally distributed. To properly account for this, we utilize a negative binomial model with robust standard errors, estimated by maximum likelihood (Long 1997). Finally, given that our dependent variables are positively trended and rarely change, we treat our data as a series of cross sections by implementing yearly fixed effects.

Independent Variables

In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, we must obtain measures of the political opportunity structures within a state. Hypothesis 3 requires a measure of the degree to which the government respects human rights in practice, as well as the level of respect for human rights in neighboring states. We discuss each of these in turn, followed by discussion of control variables.

Political Opportunity Structure—Previous work has highlighted political opportunity structures’ key role in fostering the kind of support base that is necessary for HROs to establish a local presence (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and Wiest 2005). We follow this work using an indicator of the state’s Regime Type (Polity), which is intended to capture the openness and inclusiveness of its formal political institutions. This variable, taken from the Polity IV data set, is measured on a 21-point scale running from −10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). We expect a positive relationship with HRO memberships, but a non-monotonic relationship with HRO secretariats. In particular, we contend that HRO secretariats will be more likely in countries where political opportunity structures are neither too open nor too closed. To test this hypothesis, we have to include a squared term for Polity.

Of course, not all methods of gaining access and effecting change must run through formal political channels. People and groups at the ground level can also achieve bottom-up pressure if they have the freedom to organize and mobilize around social and political issues. To capture this, we also include an indicator of the state’s respect for Organizational Rights. This variable is an ordinal index ranging from 0 to 8, composed of four component indicators from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Specifically, we sum CIRI’s measures of Freedom of Association, Freedom of Foreign Movement, Freedom of Domestic Movement, and Independence of the Judiciary. Each component variable is coded on a 0–2 scale. A 0 indicates severe restrictions on citizens’ ability to exercise the given right, a 1 indicates some restrictions, and a 2 indicates very few or no restrictions. Thus, higher values on the index indicate better government respect for citizens’ organizational rights.

Local and Neighborhood Respect for Human Rights—Hypothesis 3 concerns repression. To capture this, we rely on a measure of government respect for Physical Integrity Rights (PIR), also provided by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Physical integrity rights are “the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government” (Cingranelli and Richards 1999:407), and include freedom from disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture, and political imprisonment. Countries are given a score between 0 and 2 for each physical integrity right, in accordance with the approximate frequency with which that particular right was violated during a given year. The PIR index is measured as the sum of these four component indicators and thus ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating greater respect for this set of rights.

While we do not expect this variable to have a strong relationship with HRO membership in either direction, our theoretical treatment of its relationship with secretariat placement is a bit more complex and is argued to be conditional on the degree to which a state’s neighbors respect or repress the rights of their own citizens. To this end, we develop a measure of Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights, intended to capture the type of neighborhood a given state resides in, in terms of human rights practices. We follow Bell et al. (2012) and treat contiguous and near-contiguous states (that is, states whose minimum distance between borders is less than 50 km) as the relevant “neighborhood.” We then generated neighborhood averages of the CIRI physical integrity index by using a row-standardized connectivity matrix, w, to weight each state’s human rights practices according to (i) whether or not two states, i and j, have borders that are within 50 km of one another; and (ii) the total number of states that have borders within 50 km of state i. That is,

\[ w_{ij} = \frac{c_{ij}}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} c_{kj}}, \]

where \( c_{ij} \) equals 1 if the minimum distance between i and j is less than 50 km and 0 if it is not. Therefore, if one multiplies w by the data vector containing each state’s Physical Integrity Rights Index score, the resulting vector should contain the average level of respect for physical integrity rights among states within 50 km of every representative state i.

Given that international borders regularly change, we used a separate connectivity matrix for every year of our analysis, multiplying each only by the physical integrity rights scores for the particular year to which the matrix applied. Our connectivity matrices were obtained through the CShapes package in R (Weidmann and Gleditsch 2010; Weidmann, Kuse, and Skrede Gleditsch 2010) and were then row-standardized using the spatwmat command in Stata (Pisati 2001). Finally, given the conditional nature of our argument, we generate an interaction term between PIR and this measure of Neighborhood PIR, with the expectation that PIR will demonstrate a positive relationship with HRO secretariats at lower levels of Neigh-

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3 Like in previous work (Murdie and Bhasin 2011; for example), we linearly interpolate the years that Smith and Wiest (2005) did not code.

4 As a robustness check, we also utilize models that include polynomials of the time since the last change in the dependent variable. Our substantive results are fairly robust to this specification, which can be viewed in the Appendix S1.
borhood PIR, but a negative relationship with secretariats at higher levels of Neighborhood PIR.

Control Variables

Based on existing research from sociology, the first key control variable is globalization (Boli and Thomas 1997; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and Wiest 2005). Globalization is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, reflecting not only economic, but also political and cultural interconnectedness (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008:15). We expect citizens of states more connected to the world polity through trade and international organizations are better exposed to the cultural values underlying the global human rights movement, making it more likely that these citizens will pursue membership in HROs (Boli and Thomas 1997; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and Wiest 2005). To capture the full extent of how globalized a country is during a given year, we employ the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008). This composite measure is composed of three separate indices that measure economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalization. This variable ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater global integration. It should demonstrate a positive relationship with both HRO memberships and secretariats.

Given the importance of a state’s international ties in both incentivizing and facilitating the activities of HROs, we include another variable, Political and Economic Ties, to control for a specific set of interstate relationships that ought to affect HRO presence in a state (Hendrix and Wong 2014). Whereas globalization captures integration into the global system in the broadest possible sense, this measure is designed to capture narrower ties with more powerful and economically developed states. To account for these ties, we generate a multidimensional S-Score (Signorino and Ritter 1999) for each state in our sample. This variable uses three dimensions to calculate the degree of similarity between a given state and the G7 countries. The G7 were chosen because they are among the most economically and militarily powerful states, and because many of the HROs observed in our data are based, or have strong representation in, these particular countries. The three dimensions we use to calculate this S-Score are UN Affinity scores (Gartzke 1998), total dyadic trade (Barbieri and Keshk 2012), and alliance ties (Leeds, Ritter, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Long 2002). After the individual dyadic S-Scores are calculated, we then take the mean S-Score across the seven relevant dyads. This variable serves to control for the general similarity between the observed state and some of the most economically and militarily powerful states in the international system.\(^5\)

We draw data on Regime Durability from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). This variable is measured as the number of years since a state’s Polity score changed 3 points or more within a three-year period, indicating the extent to which a state’s institutional structures are firmly entrenched. Our expectations for this variable are mixed. We suspect that HROs’ leadership prefers more durable regimes when looking to establish permanent offices. Given that these types of investments entail high up-front costs and represent long-term commitments, the greater certainty of future risk associated with more consolidated regimes should be typically preferred to the much greater uncertainty associated with regimes in transition. In contrast, HRO memberships may respond negatively to greater regime durability. Where institutions are strongly entrenched, the status quo is likely more rigid, discouraging bottom-up efforts to challenge it. Alternatively, new regimes that are still in the process of consolidating power may be seen as weaker, and more pliable, presenting an opportunity for local pressure groups to push for political change.

Conflict and violence in a country also present interesting challenges to HROs. Though countries experiencing conflict may have a greater need for HRO assistance, they are also much more dangerous for HROs’ members and staff, leaving us agnostic about the empirical relationship. We use a simple dichotomous indicator of civil conflict, which is equal to 1 for all country-years in which there is ongoing conflict and 0 otherwise. This variable is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict database (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002). Likewise, countries where terrorist organizations or the government have demonstrated a willingness to violently target NGOs pose a very direct threat to these organizations and their members. Our measure of state-sponsored violence against NGOs was generated using the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) project. The IDEA provides information on all daily events in the Reuters Global News Service (King and Lowe 2003). We extract and produce a count of any events during a year in which the government targeted an NGO with violence. This variable thus serves as a way to capture physical aggression against organizations, not just whether citizens’ organizational rights are protected and respected.\(^6\) The data on terrorist actions against NGOs come from the Global Terrorism Database and similarly count the number of events in which terrorist organizations targeted NGOs (START 2011). We expect both to demonstrate negative relationships with HRO presence.

Wealth and development have often been considered to be important predictors of HRO engagement (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and Wiest 2005). Though great wealth likely contributed to global human rights activism in the most advanced core countries, the effects may be quite different when looking across the non-Western world. Insofar as poverty generates a greater need for HRO presence, greater wealth may actually demonstrate negative effects among the countries considered here. National Wealth is measured as GDP per capita. Larger populations may also associate with greater need in a country and provide a larger pool of potential supporters and workers from which to draw, implying a positive relationship between Population and HRO presence. Both the GDP per capita and population measures are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012) and are logged to account for skewness.

We control for Media Coverage to account for the possibility that HROs are drawn to states that enjoy greater media attention. As such, our media coverage variable is a count of all stories that mention a country in any context over the course of a year; it captures the salience of

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\(^5\) S-Scores were generated using Sweeney and Keshk’s (2005) method.

\(^6\) This variable is correlated with our organizational rights variable at \( -0.1515 \) in the sample used in the analyses. We thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to highlight how these variables were capturing distinct concepts.
a particular country in the international media, something Bob (2005), for example, has mentioned as important for gaining HRO attention. This variable is also generated from the IDEA events data (King and Lowe 2003) and is a count of all stories that mention a country during a given year. In order to account for the oft-cited Latin American bias in human rights activism and reporting (for example, Hafner-Burton and Ron 2012), we include a Latin America dummy variable that equals 1 if the state is located in Latin America and 0 otherwise.

Finally, using the same method discussed above to generate neighborhood measures of physical integrity rights, we calculate neighborhood secretariats and neighborhood memberships. Each measures the number of organizations with the corresponding type of presence among a state’s neighbors. These variables help us to ensure that the geographic clustering of our HRO presence variables do not merely drive the findings on our other independent variables, particularly our neighborhood physical integrity rights measure.

In our secretariat models, we control for neighborhood HRO secretariats and local HRO memberships. Similarly, we control for neighborhood HRO memberships and local HRO secretariats in our membership models. All of these variables are lagged one year in the following analyses.

**Results and Discussion**

The results of our analyses are reported in Table 1 below. Models 1 and 2 estimate the number of HROs with secretariats operating within a country during a given year; Models 3 and 4 estimate the number of HROs which claim memberships within a country during a given year. While Models 1 and 3 include the variables selected to evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2, Models 2 and 4 add the multiplicative interaction between a state’s physical integrity rights (PIR) score and the average PIR of its neighbors, which we use to test Hypothesis 3.

Comparing across models, patterns emerge which generally support our argument that distinct processes determine these different forms of HRO presence. First, and in accordance with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we find evidence that secretariat placements and memberships respond differently to political opportunity structures and organizational rights. Inclusive, democratic political institutions seem to provide fertile ground for the bottom-up development of HRO activism and membership, as indicated by the highly significant, positive effect of the Polity variable in Models 3 and 4. Organizational Rights perform similarly well in these models, suggesting that when these rights are better protected, people are more likely to exercise them by coordinating with others who share their human rights interests and ideals. As the results imply, we should expect to see a greater HRO membership presence in states where there are few barriers to political entry and that refrain from imposing steep obstacles to social mobilization and organization, all else being equal.

In contrast, the Polity and the Organizational Rights variables do not appear to have linear statistically significant relationship with secretariats (Models 1 and 2). However, it does appear that there is a “Goldilocks” point for political opportunity structures and HRO secretariats. In both Models 1 and 2, the Polity variable is positive and statistically significant, while the squared term is negative and statistically significant. Accordingly, HROs are more likely to invest in permanent office locations as the host-state’s openness increases, but only up to a certain point. The subtleties of this relationship can be better demonstrated in Figure 1. Based on the findings from Model 2, Figure 1 shows the predicted count of HRO secretariats as a function of the host-state’s Polity score. From this plot, we can see that the predicted count of HROs with secretariats in the target state should increase as the state becomes more open. However, we can also see that the most open states see lower predicted counts than regimes with mixed opportunity structures. Furthermore, while close, the confidence intervals shown in Figure 1 indicate that the predicted values for states at either extreme on the Polity scale (that is, −10 and +10) are statistically significantly lower than the predicted count for those states in the middle range of the Polity scale.

We also expected the theorized distinctions between the bottom-up process of membership and the top-down strategy of secretariat placement to be most evident when comparing the effects of repression, which we argued would be generally less influential for the former, but would vary for the latter in accordance with certain neighborhood characteristics. Models 1 and 3 only include the PIR and Neighborhood PIR constituent terms, without the interaction. A cursory look here reveals some interesting differences. PIR takes on a positive sign in the membership model, but fails to reach statistical significance. Neighborhood PIR, however, yields a significant negative coefficient. Insofar as memberships in these non-Western countries are motivated more by local and regional, rather than global concerns, higher levels of respect for human rights at home or in nearby states may undercut the need and/or motivation for citizens to mobilize around this particular issue. PIR demonstrates a negative relationship with secretariats in Model 1, but also falls short of statistical significance. The significant positive finding for the Neighborhood PIR term does suggest, however, that HROs secretariats are on average more plentiful in good neighborhoods than in bad neighborhoods, all else constant.

Once we introduce the PIR and Neighborhood PIR interaction term in Models 2 and 4, the results begin to take a shape that is more consistent with our argument. The constituent PIR and Neighborhood PIR variables are estimated to have significant positive effects on secretariats, while the interaction term is estimated to have a significant negative effect (Model 2). This indicates that greater respect for physical integrity rights is positively associated with HRO secretariats in states where lower levels of Neighborhood PIR are observed, but is negatively associated with this type of HRO presence in states where Neighborhood PIR is higher. In the case of memberships (Model 4), PIR remains insignificant, and the relationship in general continues to seem more noisy than meaningful. This is actually consistent with the existing literature and with our expectations here.

To provide a clearer interpretation of these results, we have graphed the marginal effect of a change in local PIR across the range of neighborhood PIR, using the estimates produced by Models 2 and 4 in Table 1. Based on Model 2, Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of an increase in a state’s PIR from the 25th percentile in our sample (a “3” on the Physical Integrity Rights Index) to the 75th percentile (a “6” on the Physical Integrity Rights Index) on the expected number of HRO secretariats across different levels of Neighborhood PIR. Figure 3 shows the same, but for the number of HROs that claim memberships in...
a country. All other variables were held at their mean or modal levels.

The results, as demonstrated in Figure 2, provide strong support for hypothesis 3. In the most highly repressive neighborhoods, where Neighborhood PIR is equal to “0”, states that exhibit a relatively higher level of respect for the physical integrity rights of their citizens (that is, PIR = 6) have a predicted count of about .15 more HRO secretariats than those states that exhibit a lower level of respect for physical integrity rights (that is, PIR = 3). This positive effect is statistically significant between 0 and 1.5 on the Neighborhood PIR measure, at which point the interactive effect becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. At first glance, this positive effect seems fairly small. However, when one considers that the modal number of HRO secretariats in our sample is zero and that in about 78% of all cases in which HRO secretariats are observed at all there is only one or two, this effect may actually be quite substantial.

The gray region in Figure 1 denotes that area for which the effect of increasing PIR is not significantly different from zero—from approximately 1.5 through 4.2 on the Neighborhood PIR measure. The effect becomes statistically significant again as we move into comparatively better neighborhoods; however, it is now in a negative direction. Where Neighborhood PIR averages between 4.2 and 8, those countries that also maintain higher respect for physical integrity rights are predicted to host between .10 and .62 fewer HRO secretariats than their more repressive counterparts. It should also be noted that there is a

### Table 1. Determinants of Human Rights Organization Secretariats and Memberships in Non-Western States: 1990–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Secretariats</th>
<th>(2) Secretariats</th>
<th>(3) Memberships</th>
<th>(4) Memberships</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)</td>
<td>−0.0327</td>
<td>0.112***</td>
<td>0.00404</td>
<td>−0.00311</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0237)</td>
<td>(0.0398)</td>
<td>(0.00628)</td>
<td>(0.0107)</td>
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<td>Average PIR of Contiguous States</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.257***</td>
<td>−0.0347***</td>
<td>−0.0427***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0194)</td>
<td>(0.0378)</td>
<td>(0.00589)</td>
<td>(0.0111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood PIR * PIR</td>
<td>−0.0356***</td>
<td>0.0174***</td>
<td>0.0107***</td>
<td>0.00191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00769)</td>
<td>(0.00797)</td>
<td>(0.000530)</td>
<td>(0.00242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td>0.121***</td>
<td>0.0174**</td>
<td>0.0181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0321)</td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td>(0.00797)</td>
<td>(0.00803)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Squared</td>
<td>−0.00659***</td>
<td>−0.00587***</td>
<td>−0.000254</td>
<td>−0.000292</td>
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<td>(0.00138)</td>
<td>(0.00140)</td>
<td>(0.000350)</td>
<td>(0.000354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Rights</td>
<td>0.0300</td>
<td>0.0369*</td>
<td>0.0202***</td>
<td>0.0196***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00215)</td>
<td>(0.0212)</td>
<td>(0.00612)</td>
<td>(0.00616)</td>
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<td>Overall Globalization Index</td>
<td>0.00711</td>
<td>0.00973***</td>
<td>0.0107***</td>
<td>0.0106***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00481)</td>
<td>(0.00461)</td>
<td>(0.00116)</td>
<td>(0.00116)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political and Economic Ties</td>
<td>0.493*</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
<td>0.0168</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.0880)</td>
<td>(0.0859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America Dummy</td>
<td>−0.559***</td>
<td>−0.619***</td>
<td>0.231***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.0281)</td>
<td>(0.0289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Durability</td>
<td>0.0166***</td>
<td>0.0183***</td>
<td>−0.000717</td>
<td>−0.000791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00165)</td>
<td>(0.00180)</td>
<td>(0.000597)</td>
<td>(0.000612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita (ln)</td>
<td>−0.138***</td>
<td>−0.223***</td>
<td>−0.0641***</td>
<td>−0.0621***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0562)</td>
<td>(0.0541)</td>
<td>(0.0136)</td>
<td>(0.0142)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>−0.00281</td>
<td>−0.0248</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0403)</td>
<td>(0.0392)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
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<td>Civil Conflict</td>
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<td>−0.0378</td>
<td>0.0336</td>
<td>0.0315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0898)</td>
<td>(0.0888)</td>
<td>(0.0254)</td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO-directed Terrorism</td>
<td>0.0215</td>
<td>0.0111</td>
<td>−0.0189</td>
<td>−0.0183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0391)</td>
<td>(0.0387)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State to NGO Violence</td>
<td>−0.291</td>
<td>−0.312</td>
<td>−0.0932</td>
<td>−0.0917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.0679)</td>
<td>(0.0677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage (ln)</td>
<td>−0.0194</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
<td>0.0539***</td>
<td>0.0532***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0474)</td>
<td>(0.0477)</td>
<td>(0.0119)</td>
<td>(0.0121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Secretariat Presence</td>
<td>0.00707</td>
<td>0.00851</td>
<td>0.00730</td>
<td>0.00730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00745)</td>
<td>(0.00730)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Memberships</td>
<td>2.060***</td>
<td>2.111***</td>
<td>0.0613***</td>
<td>0.0579***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.0109)</td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Membership</td>
<td>0.0990***</td>
<td>0.0999***</td>
<td>0.00833</td>
<td>0.00836</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.000833)</td>
<td>(0.000836)</td>
<td>(0.00833)</td>
<td>(0.00836)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRO Secretariats</td>
<td>−5.150***</td>
<td>−5.446***</td>
<td>0.871***</td>
<td>0.925***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.703)</td>
<td>(0.667)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln ( \alpha )</td>
<td>−16.69***</td>
<td>−17.13***</td>
<td>−3.044***</td>
<td>−3.048***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0746)</td>
<td>(0.0759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>1,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Yearly fixed effects not shown. Two-tailed significance tests used.

* \( p < .10 \), ** \( p < .05 \), *** \( p < .01 \).)
statistically significant change in the magnitude of this negative effect, as a shift from 3 to 6 in PIR is statistically larger (in absolute terms) in better neighborhoods (Neighborhood PIR = 8) than it is in more moderate neighborhoods (Neighborhood PIR = 5).

We interpret these results to be consistent with our expectations concerning HROs’ top-down strategy of secretariat placement, which we have argued is premised on balancing need with ability to function. That is, when entering into generally repressive neighborhoods, HROs seem more likely to base themselves in those countries that are relatively less repressive, but from where they can more efficiently and effectively serve the broader needs of the area. When entering into generally better

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Fig. 1. Predicted Count of Human Rights Organization Secretariats across Regime Types. 95% Confidence Intervals Shown

Fig. 2. Marginal Effect of a 3–6 Change in Physical Integrity Rights on Human Rights Organization Secretariat Count Across Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights. 95% Confidence Intervals Shown
neighborhoods, HROs go straight to where they are most needed, to those states that are relatively more abusive than their neighbors.

As demonstrated in Figure 3, the top-down strategy, which is evidenced in our model of secretariats, does not apply so cleanly to HRO memberships. Here, the marginal effect of a change from 3 to 6 in PIR score is not statistically distinguishable from zero at any level of the Neighborhood PIR variable. This (non-)finding is consistent with the results from Model 3, which did not force the effect of PIR to be conditional on Neighborhood PIR. We interpret this as further evidence that, among non-Western states, the bottom-up process that drives HRO memberships is most sensitive to local opportunities to engage in political activism and civil society, while the response to actual physical repression is mixed and inconsistent. The effects of these factors are not conditioned by extra-territorial considerations, in contrast to the process governing HROs’ establishment of permanent offices.

The control variables perform in largely similar and expected ways across models. The Globalization Index fails to attain statistical significance in Model 1, but is positive and significant in Models 2–4, providing support for the notion that HRO presence increases as a state becomes more highly integrated into the global political and economic community (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Smith and West 2005).

Political and Economic Ties yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Model 2, but fails to attain significance in the other models. This is not wholly unexpected—these kinds of ties likely appeal more to organizational leaders, who may use them to enhance their own organization’s effectiveness. Ties to powerful states may be less relevant for the kind of bottom-up organizational growth that we would expect to see when examining HRO memberships, however. The Latin America dummy is negative and significant for secretariats, but positive and significant for memberships. This result makes sense given previous work by Hafner-Burton and Ron (2012) concerning the long-standing tradition of home-grown advocacy in this region.

Regime Durability and Population both demonstrate inconsistent effects across secretariat and membership models. This was expected of the former, and its significant positive relationship with secretariats and negative relationship with memberships bears out these expectations. However, this is more surprising with Population, which demonstrates the expected positive association with memberships, but an unexpected negative association with secretariats. GDP Per Capita is negatively associated with both secretariats and memberships, suggesting that, outside of the highly developed core, greater national wealth results in less need for human rights activism. Interestingly, violence directed toward NGOs, either by the state or by terrorist organizations, consistently fails to reach statistical significance across all four models. The Civil Conflict variable also fails to attain statistical significance, though this may be due to some of the cross-cutting effects noted previously. There does appear to be significant spatial clustering for both memberships and secretariats, which makes sense as organizations and activist movements dedicated to increasing government respect for human rights are, by their very nature, going to be attracted to similar states and/or events. Also as expected, HRO secretariats and memberships, though following from distinct causal processes, do positively reinforce each other, all else equal.

Conclusion

A growing body of research sets out to demonstrate the impact that HROs and other INGOs have on policy and sociopolitical outcomes. While much work remains to be done, growing evidence demonstrates that these
organizations matter and that their activities not only serve to drive the narrative on matters of international human rights, but also produce real world consequences for elites and the downtrodden alike. As such, understanding where, why, and how such organizations operate acquires increasing importance.

Existing scholarship points to the fact that these organizations are most prevalent in the highly advanced countries of the Western world (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Boli and Thomas 1999; Beckfield 2003; Smith and Wiest 2005). This paper provides new and interesting insights into the choices HROs make in selecting where to locate their personnel and infrastructure, as well as what type of infrastructure to commit, when operating outside of the Western world. We demonstrate that the considerations organizations make when locating permanent offices can, in some ways, be different from the considerations motivating local volunteerism and membership. HRO membership within a state is more of a bottom-up process, driven by people at the local level and the particular political conditions they face. In contrast, the choice to place a secretariat is more of a top-down process, driven by the broader aims of organizational leadership to maximize their effectiveness in improving human rights at a global level, and the strategic trade-offs that pursuit entails. As prior research shows that members and secretariats have varying effects on political outcomes (for example, Bell et al. 2014; Murdie and Bhasin 2011), we need to understand these differences in motivation and process. This research brings us one step closer to that end.

We also make another, broader contribution here. This study’s insights result from synthesizing concepts and approaches found in related literatures that, largely as a result of disciplinary divides, previously followed disparate trajectories. Works arising from the classic civil society literature (for example, Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004) on one hand, and those rooted in the study of human rights and transnational advocacy networks (for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998) on the other, explore some of the same basic issues concerning the international and domestic determinants of HRO presence. In bringing them together, this study helps to demonstrate the advances made possible by bridging disciplinary divides. Indeed, in this case, we found that the two actually complement each other in crucial ways. Each provides an important piece of the larger puzzle. Thus, we develop a more complete understanding by allowing the insights from these two oft-distinct disciplines to speak to, rather than past, each other. This lesson surely applies elsewhere.

Altogether, this is just the tip of the iceberg in understanding where INGOs locate and the strategies they implement. The factors that influence health organizations, development organizations, pro-democracy organizations, etc. may be quite different and warrant further examination. These organizations operate with a high degree of flexibility and can establish a presence through a range of mechanisms. As such, traditional scholarly approaches to studying interactions between players in the international system may prove inadequate for understanding how and where INGOs choose to deploy their assets. As our study illustrates, conditions within states and within regional neighborhoods can be incredibly important for HROs. As research continues to unveil the myriad social and political effects of INGO and HRO activism, so too should scholars further assess where, when, and how these international movements employ their resources. In looking at the bigger picture, we may arrive at a clearer understanding of the role these actors play on the world stage and what that implies for the progress of human rights and other important causes in the years to come.

References


